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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from a judgment of guilty. The state alleged that the defendant had
violated I.C. § 18-918 by committing a battery upon Shilo High before S.Y., a minor child. The
Magistrate Court heard argument and ordered that the defense not present any evidence of its
case during the state's case and that after the state had rested the defense could make an offer of
proof as to its proposed affirmative defenses and the judge would decide at that time if she would
allow evidence to be presented on their elements. At trial, the Court sustained the state's
objection on relevance grounds to questions about the custodial relationship between Shilo High
and S.Y., and ruled that the "child in common" element of the crime would be satisfied by a
showing that both parents were the biological parents of a child. After the state had rested, the
defense presented the court with facts it would use to prove defense of another and the defense of
necessity. The Court found that no reasonable view of the defense's proffer would support either
defense. The jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant appealed the judgment. The
District Court upheld the conviction. The defendant now appeals the District Court's
Memorandum Opinion.
B.

Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts

Deputy Solar Larsen of the Kootenai County Sheriffs Department arrested Troy Young,
the defendant, for domestic battery upon Shilo High in the presence of a child on January 26,
2013. Tr. Vol. I, p. 29, L. 15-24, Tr. Vol. II, p. 187, L. 13-25, p. 189, L. 1-5, p. 196, L. 1-25. At
a pretrial motions hearing on March 27,2013, the Magistrate Court heard argument as to the
defense's proffered affirmative defense instructions, and as to the admissibility of evidence
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supporting the elements of those defenses. Tr. Vol. I, p. 18-24. The Court declined to rule at that
hearing and told counsel it would rule the following day. !d. at p. 25.
A trial was conducted before a jury on March 28,2013. Tr. Vol. I, p. 27. After voir dire,
the jury was excused and the Magistrate Court informed counsel that the defense would be
required to make an offer of proof after the state's case-in-chief as to whether a reasonable view
of the evidence presented would support the defendant's affirmative defenses. [d. at p. 89, 100102.
After preliminary instructions and the state's opening, the defense having reserved theirs,
the first witness the prosecutor called was Shilo High. Tr. Vol. II, p. 120. Ms. High testified that
the defendant was the biological father of her daughter S.Y.. Id. at p. 122. She testified that S.Y.
was four years old. Id.
The state then called Candice Rose. Tr. Vol. II, p. 123. Ms. Rose testified that Sherry
Crothers was the adoptive mother ofS.Y. and her own mother. [d. at p. 125. She testified that
Shilo High was her mother's cousin. Id. Ms. Rose explained that S.Y. was in the legal custody
of Sherry Crothers. [d.
Ms. Rose testified that on January 26,2013, she attended a birthday party for S.Y. at
Triple Play in Hayden, Idaho. Tr. Vol. II, p. 125-26. At the party were a number of family
members and friends. [d. at 125-29. At some point, a heated argument began between the
defendant and Ms. Crothers. [d. at p. 133. The defendant was indicating that Shilo High had
attempted to kill his child and was a drug addict. [d. at p. 145. The defendant demanded that
Shilo High be drug tested. Id. at p. 184. Ms. Rose further testified that the defendant grabbed his
girlfriend Tammy by the throat and mouth and told her to shut up when she chimed in. !d. at p.
-2-

145. However, this never appears in the video shown to the jury of the incident. Id. at p. 184.
Ms. Rose testified she attempted to diffuse the situation. !d. at p. 137.
Ms. Rose then testified that the defendant mounted stairs near the group. Tr. Vol. II, p.
139. Ms. Rose testified that she heard the defendant say "f-this" and then run down the stairs
toward Shilo. Id. at p. 172. Though on cross Ms. Rose testified that at that time Shilo High was
playing with S. Y., it was shown on cross that she was watching the defendant. Id. at p. 171-73.
Ms. Rose chased after the defendant and failed to stop him. !d. at p. 172. Ms. Rose testified that
the defendant tackled Shilo High, and once on top of her yelled something she did not
understand. Id. at p. 141. She testified she attempted to pull him off but he pushed her away. Id.
at p. 140. She testified that he then left out the back door. Id. at p. 141.
On cross, Ms. Rose testified that there is an ongoing custody battle between her mother
and the defendant. Tr. Vol. II, p. 173-74. The defense attempted to elicit an answer to the
question, "Who is S.y"s mother?" Id. at p. 175. The Magistrate Court removed the jury and
stated that the defense may inquire, but upon another objection as to relevance from the state, and
having heard argument from both parties, the Magistrate sustained the state's objection to the
question. Id. at p. 175-76. Specifically, the judge ruled:
THE COURT: I find it's a matter oflaw pursuant to Idaho Code 18-918(1)(a). For the
purpose of this section, household member means a person who is a spouse, former
spouse, or a person who has a child in common, regardless of whether they have been
married, or a person with whom a person is cohabitating, whether or not they have been
married, or have held themselves out to be husband or wife.
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By the plain meaning of the statutory provision, the Court would hold, at this time, the
child in common in the plain meaning is not a factual determination - it's a factual
determination of a child in common in the biological relationship, not in terms of the
custodial factual basis.
Id. at p. 177-78.

Deputy Franssen of the Kootenai County Sheriff's Department testified. Tr. Vol. II p.
209. The Deputy testified on cross examination that the defendant had told him that Shilo High
was a drug addict who had almost killed S. Y. and recently lost another child due to her drug use,
that he had been trying to get Sherry Crothers to have Ms. High drug tested, that during the
argument on that subject he saw Ms. High start to remove S.Y. from the area, and that this
caused him to see red. Tr. Vol. II p. 217-18.
At the close of the state's case, the Court had the defense offer what it deemed would be
proof that the defendant had acted in defense of his daughter and out of necessity. Tr. Vol. II, p.
220-221. The defense provided the Court with the following additional information:
JA Y LOGSDON: [W]e would be attempting to introduce evidence that Shilo High uhmy client knew her to have a ongoing drug problem. That she had in the past been urn,
labeled a hazard by Child Protection in Washington and not be allowed, without
supervision, around the child.
We were going to introduce evidence that he was aware uh, of her various suicide
attempts. That she had made statement urn, whenever she tries to get off drugs, she gets
suicidal.
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That at one point she stole S. Y. 's medications, and then took them herself uh, supposedly
to see what they were like.
That at one point she decided, because the police had pulled her over and she had drugs in
her car, she took all the drugs in the car at once before the police could get to her, and
from that, overdosed.
We were going to uh, then, also, introduce evidence that Sherry Crothers had told my
client that at one point uh, Savan - or Shilo came to the house for a visit uh, took S.Y.
with her out to a van and appeared to be trying to leave with her. That Sherry had come
out, stop her and get the child back.
So, those were the things we would have - we would expect to try to enter as to the
reasons why my client was terrified for his child's life when he saw, at this party, S.Y.
(sic) up, no drug test, attempt to leave with his child out a back door.
It's our belief that at this point there's been no evidence that, that's not what happened.
There was some evidence that was introduced by Candice to the contrary, but then after
watching the video, it's quite clear that she has no idea what was happening at the time
when my client was on the stairs looking out, uh, before he decided to go off and try to
save his child. So, at this point that is a vacant space, except of course, the statements
that he made to the Officer which are now part of the record. Thank you.

Id. at p. 221-222.
The state then took the position that it would be appropriate to allow the defendant to elicit this
evidence and stated that the burden of production would be on the defense and the burden of
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persuasion being on the state. !d. at p. 222-224. The Court decided to issue a ruling the next day.

ld.
The following day the Court ruled that neither of the defense's requested instructions on
the affinnative defenses of defense of another and necessity may be offered. Tr. Vol. II, p. 229236. The Court found that Ms. High may have attempted to leave with S.Y. ld. at p. 234, L. 1-3.
As to the defense of another instruction, the Court found that the defense required a threat of
bodily hann, not mere hann, to be imminent. !d. at 233, L. 6-25. Therefore, the Court found that
the defense's offer did meet the required element. ld. The Court further found that no reasonable
view of the evidence made the defendant's actions necessary.ld. at p. 234. The Court listed a
number of alternatives that the defendant might have taken, and referred to the presence of other
people in the area. ld.
On similar grounds the Court rejected the necessity defense instruction. The Court found
that there were less offensive alternatives and listed a number of examples. ld. at p. 236.
The defense argued again that the issues that the Court believed foreclosed were best left
to a jury to detennine what was reasonable. ld. at p. 237, L. 17-25, p. 238, L. 1-11.
The Court having made its rulings, the defense rested.ld. at p. 237, L. 13-15. Closings
were given. !d. at p. 263-282. The jury found the defendant gUilty. ld. at p. 280. The defendant
timely filed a notice of appeal under LC.R. 54. 1(a), et.seq. from the judgment of the Court.
The District Court heard argument on September 23,2013. The state never argued that
the defendant had failed to provide evidence of a specific threat for purposes of a necessity
defense, and the Court referred to the issue as being how immediate the threat was by making
reference to State v. Walsh, 141 Idaho 870 (Ct.App.2005). Tr.Appeal, p. 6. On October 3,2013,
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the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion upholding the defendant's conviction. The District
Court found that "the term 'child in common' does not depend upon a person's legal rights to
custody of a child." The Court further found that to give the defense of another instruction, there
must have been an imminent threat of bodily harm. Prevention of a felony would not suffice.
Lastly, the Court found that the necessity defense was properly refused along with the evidence
supporting it because the Court found that no evidence of any specific threat had been provided
to the trial court in the defendant's offer of proof. The Court did not issue any ruling on whether
the Magistrate Court had erred in weighing the evidence and finding that reasonable alternative
actions were available to the defendant. The defendant timely filed a notice of appeal from the
District Court's Memorandum Opinion.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

The defendant was denied his right to fully present a defense and his right to a
trial by jury as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Art. I §§ 7, 13 of the Idaho Constitution.

II.

Whether the state must prove that the defendant and the alleged victim have an
ongoing relationship with a child to convict someone of domestic battery
predicated on the "child in common" qualifier.

III.

Whether to raise the affirmative defense of self defense or defense of another a
defendant must how that the harm to be avoided was bodily injury or if the
prevention of a felony suffices.

IV.

Whether a trial court is called upon to weigh evidence when determining whether
an instruction may be given.

V.

Whether the District Court may find sua sponte find error in the lower court's
rulings.

VI.

Whether the facts presented to the trial court, including but not limited to the
defendant's knowledge of or belief in the alleged victim's previous attempt to
kidnap his daughter, her drug addiction, her suicidal tendencies, her violent
tendencies, and the fact that the defendant saw the alleged victim hurrying his
child toward and exit door during an argument that had distracted everyone else in
the area amounted to a "specific threat" capable of supporting an instruction for
the necessity defense.
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ARGUMENT
1.
A.

Introduction
In East's Pleas of the Crown, the author, considering what sort of an attack it was
lawful and justifiable to resist, even by the death of the assailant, says: 'A man
may repel force by force in defense of his person, habitation, or property against
one who manifestly intends and endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a
known felony, such as murder, rape, robbery, arson, burglary, and the like, upon
either. In these cases he is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary
until he has secured himself from all danger; and if he kill him in so doing it is
called justifiable self-defense; as, on the other hand, the killing by such felon of
any person so lawfully defending himself will be murder. But a bare fear of any of
these offenses, however well grounded,-as that another lies in wait to take away
the party's life,-unaccompanied with any overt act indicative of such an intention,
will not warrant in killing that other by way of prevention. There must be an
actual danger at the time.' Page 271.

Beardv. Us., 158 U.S. 550,562 (1895). Thus, even prior to the revolution, Americans were
accustomed to the law's recognition oftheir right to defend themselves and that which they held
dear. The people of the United States lived long under tyranny, and their wish to be able to
defend themselves free of encumbrance survives, in part, in the Second Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. However, when the state ofIdaho was founded, those who
wrote its Constitution, recognizing the importance of preventing government from robbing
citizens of the right to defending themselves, grounded that right into the first words of the
document. And so, Article I § 1 of the Idaho Constitution opens with the statement:
All men are by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among
which are enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and
protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing safety.
The District Court in this case erred when it upheld the Magistrate's denial of the defendant's
right to present his defenses to the jury, and thereby violated his right to present a defense and his
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right to have the jury decide his guilt. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI; IDAHO CONST. art. I §§ 7,
13.

B.

Standard for Review
Whether the jury has been instructed properly is a question of law over which this Court

exercises free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65 (1992). In determining whether the trial
court should have given a requested jury instruction, this Court must examine the instructions
that were given and the evidence adduced at trial. State v. Fetterly, 126 Idaho 475, 476
(Ct.App.1994).
The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the province of the trial
court. A trial court's determination as to the admission of evidence at trial will only be reversed
where there has been an abuse of that discretion. State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 973-74
(1992). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it;
and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger,
115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).

C.

The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate's refusal of the defendant's defense
instructions and exclusion of evidence supporting those defenses.
The trial court is required to charge the jurors with all matters necessary for their

information so that the jury may be correctly informed with respect to the nature and elements of
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the crime charged and any essential legal principles applicable to the evidence admitted. State v.

Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 758 (Ct.App.1992). A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on
every defense or theory of defense having any support in the evidence. State v. Hansen, 133
Idaho 323, 328 (Ct.App.1999).
Idaho Code § 19-2132(a) requires that the trial court must state to the jury being charged
"all matters of law necessary for their information," and must give a requested jury instruction if
it determines that instruction to be correct and pertinent. Under a four-part test, a requested
instruction must be given where: (1) it properly states the governing law; (2) a reasonable view of
the evidence would support the defendant's legal theory; (3) it is not addressed adequately by
other jury instructions; and (4) it does not constitute an impermissible comment as to the
evidence. Fetterly, 126 Idaho at 476-77; State v. Evans, 119 Idaho 383,385 (Ct.App.1991). To
meet the second prong of this test, the defendant must present at least some evidence supporting
his theory, and any support will suffice as long as his theory comports with a reasonable view of
the evidence. Fetterly, 126 Idaho at 476-77; Kodesh, 122 Idaho at 758. If the foregoing criteria
are met, but the requested instruction incorrectly states the law, the trial court is "under the
affirmative duty to properly instruct the jury." State v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 91 (1992).
However, the United States Supreme Court, in addressing a Sixth Amendment
Compulsory Process Clause claim, has held that in order to establish a violation of the
constitutional right to present evidence, a defendant "must at least make some plausible showing
of how [the] testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense." United

States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982). In addressing the materiality standard,
the United States Supreme Court explained:
- 11 -

The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the
justice of the finding of guilt.... This means that the omission must be evaluated in
the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether
or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new
trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity,
additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a
reasonable doubt.

Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 868 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13
(1976)). Similarly, the Idaho Appellate Court has stated, in addressing a Sixth Amendment
compulsory process claim, that "[i]n constitutional terms, evidence is material if it would create a
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors that did not otherwise exist." State v. Garza, 109
Idaho 40, 43 (Ct.App.1985).
Further, "the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense,' " Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California

v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). In In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) the Supreme
Court described the right of an individual to "be heard in his defense - a right to his day in court"
as one of the most "basic" ingredients of due process oflaw. In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 19 (1967), the Court similarly explained that "the right to present a defense" is a
"fundamental element of due process of law." This right has been held to include the right to
present evidence going to the issue of guilt (see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973));
the right to present evidence relevant to sentencing (Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979)); and
the right of a defendant to testifY in his or her own behalf (see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44

(1987)). See also Crane, 476 U.S. at 690 (discussing constitutional guarantee ofa "meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense" and "an opportunity to be heard"). All of these rights
are designed to ensure a fair procedure at which the defendant is allowed to present his side of
- 12 -

the case - whether his side relates to refuting an element of the offense or to establishing a
relevant affirmative defense. See Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972) (reversing conviction
based on state judge's interference with the defendant's right "to present his own witnesses to
establish a defense"). See generally Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An
Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 713 (1976).
Even in the civil context, the Court has held repeatedly that due process carries with it a
basic right "to be heard." Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971); Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. (78 U.S.) 223, 233 (1863). As
the Court explained in Logan: this right requires "an opportunity ... granted at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner for [aJ heating appropriate to the nature ofthe case." Logan, 455
U.S. at 137 (citations omitted). The Court has held that defendants have a right to present all
available defenses. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin,
287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932)).
The right to present a defense carries with it, of course, the right to have the trier of fact
consider the proffered defense. Thus, in Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972), Marilyn
Cool's defense turned on the testimony of one Robert Voyles, her alleged accomplice. At Cool's
trial, Voyles testified that he alone was guilty of the crime charged and that Cool had nothing to
do with the crime. The trial judge gave the jury an "accomplice instruction" which provided that
accomplice testimony is "open to suspicion" but that if the jury is convinced that Voyles's
testimony "is true beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury should give it the same effect as you
would to a witness not in any respect implicated in the alleged crime." Id. at 102. In reversing
Cool's conviction, this Court held that this instruction concerning one of the defense witnesses
- 13 -

violated, among other rights, the defendant's rights to present evidence as recognized in

Washington v. Texas. The Court explained that the "instruction given below impermissibly
obstructs the exercise of that right by totally excluding relevant evidence unless the jury makes a
preliminary determination that it is extremely reliable." 409 U.S. at 104.
In this case, the lower Court took issue with the defendant's view of what he may defend
his child from, and what a reasonable person would have believed. The Magistrate was incorrect
on both counts, as will be shown below. The District Court upon review of the Magistrate's
decisions agreed with the Magistrate as to what one may defend another against, but sustained
the denial of the defendant's proffered necessity defense on a separate basis, namely, that the
District Court did not see any evidence in the record that a specific threat had been identified by
the defense.

i. The District Court erred in finding that selfdefense requires that the jury find
imminent danger of bodily harm, rather than harm.
At trial, the defense presented a modified version of the Idaho Criminal Judicial
Instruction 1517. The Court found the modification from "bodily harm" to "harm" improper.
The District Court upheld this ruling. This was in error. The

len is based upon I.C. §§ 18-4009,

18-4010 and 18-4013. These statutes address defenses in cases of homicide, but they are similar
to the other self defense statutes in Idaho. See, e.g., I.C. § 19-202A. All of them state a variation
of:
Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in either of the
following cases:
1. When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to
do some great bodily injury upon any person; ...
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Thus, the citizens ofIdaho, much like the early colonists from England, enjoy a right to defend
themselves and others from the perpetration of felonies. Kidnapping is a felony. See I.C. §§ 184501, 18-4502, and 18-4503. Therefore, the law protected the defendant's right to defend his
daughter from being kidnapped.
The District and Magistrate Court both relied on the limited language provided in the
Idaho Criminal Judicial Instruction rather than the the law of defense of another. It is the law,
and not the example instruction, that controls this defendant's fate. 1 This Court should overrule
the lower Courts' refusals to allow the defendant's defense of another instruction and remand for
a new trial.

ii. The Magistrate Court erred in imposing the judge's own belief as to what is
reasonable in the place of the jurors' and therefore refusing to allow the
defendant to present a defense.
The Magistrate Court refused both defenses on the grounds that it did not believe a
reasonable view of the evidence supported the instructions. Tr. Vol. II, p. 229-236. The Court
listed a number of options available to the defendant at the time of the incident. However, as the
defense argued, the reasonability of the alternatives the Court proposed was capable of dispute.
Id. at p. 237, L. 17-25, p. 238, L. 1-11. The District Court took no position on the matter.

I It is worth noting that

len

1514 provides that homicide is justified if:

"committed in defense of habitation, property or person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by
violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous or
tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of offering violence to any person therein.
However, the bare fear of such acts is not sufficient unless the circumstances are sufficient to create such a fear in a
reasonable person and the defendant acted under the influence of such fears alone"
It would be a strange law indeed if it permitted a person to kill to prevent a felony but determined that any lesser
measures were criminal acts.
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The crux of the problem is that the lower Court misconstrued the "reasonable view of the
evidence" requirement to mean what would be reasonable from the trial judge's perspective. I.C.
§ 19-2132(a) did not change the common law standard the required that a defense be given if any
evidence existed as to each element. Hansen, 133 Idaho at 328. The "reasonable view" standard
is simply a different way of saying that at least some evidence must reasonably support the
instruction. It does not mean that the Court may weigh the evidence and make the actual
determination of factual reasonableness in the place of the jury.
This Court should compare this with the scope of review for sufficiency of evidence to
support a conviction. The Idaho Court of Appeals has found that in when reviewing a denied
motion for acquittal:
[the Court] independently review[s] the evidence to determine whether a
reasonable mind could conclude that the defendant's guilt on every material
element of the offense of which he stands convicted had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt by substantial and competent evidence. [The Court] do[es] not
substitute [its] view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the
weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable interferences to be drawn
from the evidence. Where the defendant stands convicted, [the Court] view[s] all
reasonable inferences in the state's favor.

State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862 (Ct.App.2004) citing State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 395
(Ct.App.2000); State. v. Kapsa, 126 Idaho 512, 521 (Ct.App.l994); State v. Mata, 107 Idaho
863, 866 (Ct.App.1984). Similarly, when deciding whether to allow the defendant to provide a
defense, the Court may not decide for the jury what reasonable inferences are to be drawn from
the evidence. The Court is required to ensure that an instruction that is supported by no evidence
is not given, not that instructions be kept out because the Court does not feel the defense
reasonable. That is a direct violation of the defendant's right to a trial by jury. As the United
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States Supreme Court has held:
In sum, our reexamination of our cases in this area, and of the history upon which
they rely, confirms the opinion that we expressed in Jones. Other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to ajury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. With that exception, we endorse the statement of the rule set
forth in the concurring opinions in that case: "[I]t is unconstitutional for a
legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is
equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt." 526 U.S., at 252-253 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); see also id., at 253
(opinion of SCALIA, J.).

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000); citing Jones v. US., 526 U.S. 227 (1999). It
is for the jury to assess the defendant's requested defenses in view of the facts.
The lower Court's ruling also failed to take into consideration cases allowing defenses
similar to that offered here. In State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854 (1990), the Idaho Supreme Court
held that a defendant may produce evidence at trial that it was necessary for her to use marijuana
to ease her pain. The Court closed with these lines:
We hold that Lynn Hastings is entitled to present evidence at trial on the common
law defense of necessity. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether or not she
has met the elements of that defense.

ld. .at 856. The Court also cited as persuasive authority State v. Boettcher, 443 N.W.2d 1
(S.D.1989), a case involving "a mother fear[ing] that her daughter was being sexually abused in
her grandparents' home, [who] was allowed to raise the necessity defense to charges of burglary,
assault and kidnapping." ld. It is unlikely then that the lower Court's ruling in this case
comported with the law of this state, for certainly mothers have other options besides breaking
into homes and assaulting and kidnapping their owners. What action is reasonable under the
circumstances or a viable alternative is an inference that must be left to the trier of fact.
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In this case, the Court refused two instructions and excluded evidence of the defendant's
defense because the Court did not believe that the defendant's actions were reasonable or the
least offensive alternative under the circumstances. This holding was a misapplication of the law
and a violation of the defendant's right to present a complete defense and have the facts
determined by the jury. Therefore, the lower Court's ruling must be reversed, and the case
remanded for a new trial.
iii. The District Court erred in sua sponte finding no evidence of a specific threat and
upholding the Magistrate's denial of the defendant's requested necessity defense
instruction on that basis.
Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal.
State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195 (1992). Where a party appeals the decision of an intermediate
appellate court, the appellant may not raise issues that are different from issues presented to the
intermediate court. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275 (2003). An issue is different ifit is not
substantially the same or does not sufficiently overlap with an issue raised before the trial court.
See id. at 277-78. To illustrate, the Idaho Supreme Court in Sheahan determined that even where
the primary arguments made at trial were that unfair pretrial publicity and community prejudice
deprived the defendant of a fair trial, the trial judge had considered all of the arguments on the
issue of a fair trial made by the defendant on appeal. The Court stated, "The trial judge
recognized and addressed these issues as falling within the factors to be considered," and thus,
they were preserved. Id. at 278. In other words, the issues raised on appeal, though expanded
upon, were substantially the same as those argued before the trial court.
In this case, the trial court did consider the offer of proof and found that while a threat
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had been perceived by the defendant, his reaction was unreasonable. The District Court
disagreed, saying that no threat existed. That issue was not briefed by the parties or argued
before the District Court. The District Court had mentioned thinking that there was a question of
how immediate the threat would have been, but the immediacy of the threat and whether there
was a specific threat are quite different issues. The District Court plainly erred in making its
ruling on its proffered basis.
Even if this Court were to find the District Court's ruling not improper on the basis of it
not being raised as an issue by either party, the fact remains that a specific threat was clearly
presented by the defense. The facts presented to the trial court were the alleged victim's previous
kidnapping attempt of the same child as in this case, her drug addiction, her suicidal tendencies,
her violent tendencies, and the fact that she was walking the defendant's child toward an exit
door during an argument that occupied the attention of the rest of the people attending the scene.
It is difficult to square the District Court's ruling with the reality of the situation presented to the

defendant as a loving father. There should be no question that these facts amounted to a
"specific threat" of kidnapping capable of supporting giving the instruction for a necessity
defense. The state never argued that they did not, and the District Court was wrong to find
otherwise.

II.
A.

Introduction
The Magistrate Court erred in finding that the element of "household member" could be

fulfilled merely by a showing that the defendant and the alleged victim were the biological
parents of the same child and that therefore evidence of the alleged victim's relationship with the
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child and defendant was irrelevant. The Court's ruling runs afoul of precedent relating to the
rationality ofI.C. § 18-918, and must be reversed.
B.

Standard of Review
Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of law. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667

(2010); State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210,214 (Ct.App.2009). Therefore, when considering
admission of evidence of other acts, an appellate court exercises free review of the trial court's
relevancy determination. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214.
C.

The Court erred in determining that the statutory requirement that the defendant and Ms.
High have a child in common was met with proof that Ms. High and the defendant were
the biological parents of the same child

I. C. § 18-918(1)(a) states in relevant part:
"Household member" means a person who is a spouse, former spouse, or a person
who has a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or a
person with whom a person is cohabiting, whether or not they have married or
have held themselves out to be husband or wife.
The Magistrate Court held that to have a child in common merely meant that both parents be the
biological parent of the child. This limitation on the scope of the definition has no basis in the
statute and is in conflict with the precedents of the Idaho Supreme Court.
In State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 830-831 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
The domestic relationship is a unique relationship. Even when the parties no
longer share the relationship the law may impose obligations, such as alimony,
child support, or child custody arrangements, which require the parties to continue
to interact and to do so on a highly emotional level. Because of the nature of the
relationship there is an increased opportunity for violence to occur and continue.
The decision of the legislature to extend additional protection to household
members is rationally related to the state's interest in preventing violence between
those involved in some type of domestic relationship. Thus, we hold that I.C. §
18-918(3) does not violate equal protection.
The Court's holding would be in error ifthe statute is defined in the limited way the District
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Court ruled in this case. The law cannot single out for increased punishment those who have a
produced a child when one or both has no further relationship with the child or the other person.
The reasoning used by the Idaho Supreme Court does not apply to such circumstances.
In State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 867 (2011), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
In determining legislative intent, this Court applies the maxim noscitur a sociis,
which means "a word is known by the company it keeps." State v. Hammersley,
134 Idaho 816, 821 (2000). Here, all examples of "household member" preceding
the ambiguous phrase-"spouse, former spouse, or a person who has a child in
common regardless of whether they have been married"--denote a marital or
intimate relationship. LC. § 18-918( 1)(a). In addition, the phrase at issue is
followed by the qualifying phrase "whether or not they have married or have held
themselves out to be husband or wife." Id That qualifying phrase indicates
legislative intent that "a person with whom a person is cohabiting" is to add to the
definitional list any intimate relationships that do not rise to the marital or coparental statuses already listed, such as boyfriend-girlfriend relationships. Indeed,
if the Legislature had intended "cohabiting" to include anyone living under the
same roof, regardless of relationship, there would be no need for the qualifying
phrase at all.
Again, the Court focuses on the relationship between the defendant apd the alleged victim.
Domestic violence is something that occurs between those in an intimate relationship or who at
least have shared responsibilities for the raising of a child. Where that relationship has ceased to
exist, it cannot be said that the parties have the child "in common." The child belongs to one
party. The other person may, as here, only exist as a possible threat to that child's well-being.
To give that biological parent special protections is contrary to the purpose of the law.
The District Court's ruling seems to imply that all biological parents have a relationship
that requires them to continue to interact and do so at a highly emotional level. That obviously is
not true. The world is replete with biological parents who have neither the possibility of actual
or legal relationships with their child or the other parents (biological and otherwise). Thus, the
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words "have in common" generally denote something actively had jointly by the parties. See
Merriam Webster Dictionary (2013). Where one parent does not have a parental relationship
with the child, it cannot be said that they "have" the child. The state presumably does not have
an interest in providing extra protection to those who simply wish to "have" the child or once
"had" the child but lost the child due, undoubtedly, to their own actions. Such protection would
hardly be in the interest of the child, the legitimate parent, or society.
This Court should hold that to "ha[ve] a child in common" is the designation of an
enduring relationship. The jury must decide whether under the particular circumstances of the
case that relationship exists. Where the biological mother, as here, no longer has any ties to the
child and is in fact viewed as detrimental to its well-being, it cannot be said she "has a child in
common" with the defendant.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the lower Court's holding and remand for a new trial
where evidence of the relationship between Shilo High and S.Y. may be introduced to the jury.
CONCLUSION
The case before this Court requires it to reaffirm a defendant's right to have his innocence
or guilt decided by a group of his peers. This Court should reverse the conviction and order the
lower court to allow evidence of his defenses, to instruct the jury on the defenses offered if that
evidence is in the record at close of trial, and to allow evidence to be elicited as to the
relationship between the defendant and the alleged victim.
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